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beneficiaries also have a right to rely on the statute for the
protection of their interest in the deposits.
However disquieting this decision, it is Wisconsin law.
Banks and beneficiaries alike are left without statutory protec-
tion in the case of gifts of bank deposits where those gifts are
sustainable with clear and convincing evidence of strong dona-
tive intent. There need be no possession of the bank deposit
book by the donee nor any writing indicating the gift delivered
to the bank so long as the bank deposits are part of a larger
interest, a partnership interest, given as a valid gift to the
donee.
BARBARA BECKER
TAXATION
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in its 1974 term, was con-
fronted with very few tax questions. Of those encountered,
three are especially noteworthy. The first is significant for a
Wisconsin resident who invests as a limited partner in a part-
nership which is not engaged in business in Wisconsin, the
second for a Wisconsin manufacturer who contracts with the
federal government, and the third for a Wisconsin landowner
who is concerned with the methods used to determine real es-
tate assessments.
I. INCOME TAXATION
Generally, income or loss is included in one's Wisconsin
adjusted gross income if the situs of the income or loss is Wis-
consin.' Determining the situs of income is controlled by Wis-
consin Statute section 71.07(1).2 In that statute, various cate-
gories of income or loss are described, and the situs of each
category is specified.3
1. Wis. STAT. §§ 71.02(2)(e), 71.05(1), and 71.07 (1973).
2. Wis. STAT. § 71.07(1) was amended by Wis. Laws 1971, ch. 125. The 1971 amend-
ment applies to tax returns for calendar year 1973 or the corresponding fiscal year and
years thereafter. For income years prior to 1973, the 1969 statute should be used. It
must be noted that although the 1969 statute was applied in Sweitzer v. Department
of Revenue, 65 Wis. 2d 235, 222 N.W.2d 662 (1974), the principal case in this Income
Taxation section of the Term of Court, the outcome of the case would not have been
affected by the 1971 amendment, the bulk of which affects corporations, not individu-
als.
3. Wis. STAT. § 71.07(1) (1973):
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Sweitzer v. Department of Revenue4 is the first Wisconsin
Supreme Court determination of the situs of income or loss
from a limited partner's interest in a partnership engaged in
business outside of Wisconsin. In 1968, a limited partnership,
which had sixty-three limited partners including Joseph M.
Sweitzer, a Wisconsin resident, and two general partners, suf-
fered a loss. The partnership did not engage in business in
Wisconsin. Sweitzer deducted his share of the loss in determin-
ing his Wisconsin adjusted gross income for 1968.
The Wisconsin Department of Revenue disallowed the loss
deduction on the grounds that it was "income or loss from
business" and that its situs was the place of business under
section 71.07(1). 5 The Wisconsin tax appeals commission and
the Circuit Court for Marathon County each affirmed the de-
partment's determination on appeals.
Sweitzer claimed that the loss arose from intangible per-
sonal property and was in the "all other income or loss" cate-
gory of section 71.07(1). Thus, he argued, the loss followed the
residence of the recipient and was properly deducted.6 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed and reversed the judgment of
the circuit court.
The court found that the principle in this case was indistin-
guishable from that in A. L. Skolnik v. Wisconsin Department
of Taxation.7 In Skolnik, the Wisconsin board of tax appeals
held that a Wisconsin resident's income from his interest in an
Illinois trust, over which the trustees had exclusive control, fit
into the "all other income or loss" category of section 71.07(1)
and was subject to Wisconsin income tax because his interest
(1) For the purposes of taxation income or loss from business, not requiring
apportionment under sub. (2), (3) or (5), shall follow the situs of the business
from which derived. Income or loss derived from rentals and royalties from real
estate or tangible personal property, or from the operation of any farm, mine or
quarry, or from the sale of real property or tangible personal property shall
follow the situs of the property from which derived. . . . Income from personal
services and from professions of resident individuals shall follow residence. In-
come from personal services of nonresident individuals, including income from
professions, shall follow the situs of the services. All other income or loss, includ-
ing income or loss derived from land contracts, mortgages, stocks, bonds and
securities or from the sale of similar intangible personal property, shall follow
the residence of the recipient, except as provided in sub. (7).
4. 65 Wis. 2d 235, 222 N.W.2d 662 (1974).
5. Id. at 239, 222 N.W.2d at 664.
6. Id.
7. 5 W.B.T.A. 41 (1962).
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in the trust was analogous to that of a shareholder in a corpora-
tion since they both have equitable ownership but no right to
manage operations.
In Sweitzer, the court held that a limited partner's interest
in a partnership could be similarly analogous.' The partnership
agreement, to which Sweitzer was a party, provided that the
two general partners had exclusive control over the manage-
ment and operation of the business, and that the distribution
of the partnership's funds was in their sole discretion. Further-
more, the general partners were not accountable to, nor could
they be held liable to, the limited partners for their activities
unless undertaken in bad faith or in a grossly negligent man-
ner. As in other limited partnerships, the limited partner's risk
of loss was limited to the amount of his investment. These
factors, the court held, indicated that the limited partner's
interest was in the nature of intangible personal property in
that the limited partner had equitable ownership of the busi-
ness but no power to manage it.
The court thus ruled that where a limited partner's interest
in a partnership is passive, indicated by a complete lack of
control over the management or operation of the business, any
income or loss derived from that interest falls within the "all
other income or loss" category of section 71.07(1) and the tax
situs is the place of residence of the recipient.'
IX. PERSONAL PROPERTY TAXATION
In determining to whom specific personal property will be
assessed for taxation purposes, Wisconsin Statute section
70.18(1) is controlling.'" In applying that section, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has determined that title and ownership are
not always the same, and that the tax on personal property
should be assessed against the true or beneficial owner of the
property."
In Teledyne Industries, Inc. v. Milwaukee,'" the court was
faced with the question of whether Teledyne or the federal
8. 65 Wis. 2d at 240-41, 222 N.W.2d at 665.
9. Id. at 242, 222 N.W.2d at 666.
10. Wis. STAT. § 70.18(1) (1973):
(1) Personal property shall be assessed to the owner thereof, except that
when it is in the charge of possession of some person other than the owner it
may be assessed to the person so in charge or possession of the same.
11. American Motors Corp. v. Kenosha, 274 Wis. 315, 80 N.W.2d 363 (1957).
12. 65 Wis. 2d 557, 223 N.W.2d 586 (1974).
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government was the beneficial owner of certain personal prop-
erty, specifically, raw materials, purchased parts, and work-in-
process inventories. The property was connected with a defense
contract between Teledyne and the federal government. The
court had ruled on a similar question in American Motors Corp.
v. Kenosha'3 (which found beneficial ownership in the com-
pany) and in State ex rel. General Motors Corp. v. Oak Creek"
(which found benenicial ownership in the government). While
Teledyne does not result in any new law, its discussion and
comparison of the facts in American Motors, General Motors,
and Teledyne helps to clarify the law in this area.
In determining who was the beneficial owner of the inven-
tories, the factors that were examined included: (1) who had
legal title, (2) who could use the property and under what
conditions, if any, (3) who bore the risk of loss for damage and
destruction, (4) who was responsible for minor repairs, (5) who
controlled the acquisition and disposition of the property, (6)
to what degree the government inspected the property, and (7)
whether special records were required.'5 An overview of the
three cases indicates that no one factor was controlling, but
rather, all the facts of the particular situation were considered
as a whole. However, while the facts in the three cases were
very similar, there are three areas where significant differences
arise: control, inspection, and risk of loss.
In American Motors, the court found that the company had
an unrestricted right to acquire or dispose of the property,'6
that the government did not inspect the property, and that the
company bore the risk of loss. The court ruled that this was
inconsistent with ownership in the government and that Amer-
ican Motors was the beneficial owner of the property.
In General Motors, the government had control over the
acquisition and disposition of the property, inspectors were in
the plant at all times, and the risk of loss remained in the
government. The company did have the right to rent the gov-
ernment property, but that was held to be a minimal ownership
interest. The court determined that General Motors did not
13. 274 Wis. 315, 80 N.W.2d 363 (1957).
14. 49 Wis. 2d 299, 182 N.W.2d 481 (1971).
15. Id. at 309, 182 N.W.2d at 486.
16. In Teledyne Industries, Inc. v. Milwaukee, 65 Wis. 2d at 572 n. 10, 223 N.W.2d
at 594, at n. 13 [sic] the court notes that three cases from other jurisdictions have
questioned that conclusion in the American Motors case.
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have beneficial ownership of the property.
Though the facts in Teledyne were very similar to both of
these cases, the court ruled that it was more analogous to
General Motors.17 Teledyne's right to acquire and dispose of the
property was restricted and government inspectors were in the
plant at all times. However, like American Motors, the com-
pany, under the contract, had to bear the risk of loss. The city
relied heavily on this fact in its brief and oral argument, but
the court was not impressed. The court, rather than finding
that this was an indication of beneficial ownership by Tele-
dyne, came to the opposite conclusion saying:
The only way the government could protect itself was to: (1)
insure its own property; (2) specify the conditions under
which Teledyne would be liable for loss as was done in
General Motors; or (3) make Teledyne in effect an insurer by
contracting that the risk of loss would be on Teledyne. The
latter method was followed. It was stipulated that Teledyne
insured the property. The fact that Teledyne was in essence
an insurer of property, title to which was in the government,
strengthens rather than detracts from the concept that the
government is the beneficial owner as well as the legal title
holder of the property in question."
In past decisions, the court's conclusion, that bearing the risk
of loss was one of the indications of ownership, was based on
the assumption that the owner of property usually bears the
risk of its loss. In view of the simple logic of this past position,
the court's reasoning that the concept of beneficial ownership
in the government is strengthened by Teledyne bearing the risk
of loss seems strained. Perhaps what the court really wanted
to say was indicated by a later statement that "[c]ases from
other jurisdictions involving similar circumstances have held
that placing the risk of loss on the contractor is not by itself
inconsistent with government ownership.'""
Thus, the court's decision in Teledyne indicates two things
with respect to determining who is the beneficial owner of prop-
erty connected with a government contract. First, all the fac-
tors involved in a particular situation must be considered as a
whole with no one factor controlling. Second, in examining
17. 65 Wis. 2d at 573, 223 N.W.2d at 594.
18. Id. at 569, 223 N.W.2d at 592.
19. Id. at 569-70, 223 N.W.2d at 592.
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these factors, who bears the risk of loss now appears to be of
less significance, but special emphasis should be placed on the
degree of government control over the acquisition and disposi-
tion of the property and the amount of government inspection
of the property.
III. REAL PROPERTY TAXATION
Wisconsin Statute section 70.32(1)20 controls the valuation
of real estate for rear property tax purposes. It requires that an
assessor use the best information available to value real estate
"at the full value which could ordinarily be obtained therefor
at private sale." 2' In interpreting this statute, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has held that the best information of fair mar-
ket value, in the order of priority, is (1) a sale of the property
involved, (2) sales of reasonably comparable property, or (3) all
the factors collectively which have a bearing on the value of the
property. The information of the highest priority must be used,
and it is error to do otherwise.22
Fair market value has been defined in Wisconsin as "the
amount the property could be sold for in the open market by
an owner willing and able but not compelled to sell to a pur-
chaser willing and able but not obliged to buy."2 3 Normally, an
actual sale of the property involved would be "the best of the
best information" of fair market value. However, there are two
occasions when it would be inappropriate to use a sale of the
property as a guide in assessing its value. The first is when the
sale price does not reflect the true fair market value because
20. Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1) (1973):
(1) Real property shall be valued by the assessor in the manner specified
in the Wisconsin property assessment manual provided under s. 73.03(2a) from
actual view or from the best information that the assessor can practicably ob-
tain, at the full value which could ordinarily be obtained therefor at private sale.
In determining the value the assessor shall consider, as to each piece, its advan-
tage or disadvantage of location, quality of soil, quantity of standing timber,
water privileges, mines, minerals, quarries, or other valuable deposits known to
be available therein, and their value; but the fact that the extent and value of
minerals or other valuable deposits in any parcel of land are unascertained shall
not preclude the assessor from affixing to such parcel the value which could
ordinarily be obtained therefor at private sale.
21. Id.
22. State ex rel. Enterprise Realty Co. v. Swiderski, 269 Wis. 642, 70 N.W.2d 34
(1955).
23. State ex rel. Lincoln Fireproof Warehouse Co. v. Board of Review, 60 Wis. 2d
84, 89, 208 N.W.2d 380, 382 (1973), quoting from State ex rel. Markarian v. Cudahy,
45 Wis. 2d 683, 685, 173 N.W.2d 627, 629 (1970).
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the sale was not an arm's-length transaction or because one of
the parties was compelled to act. The burden is on the person
attacking the assessment, which was not based on the sales
price, to show the fairness of the sale."4 The second is a result
of the Wisconsin Constitution. Article VIII, section 1 requires
that "taxation shall be uniform." This has been held to mean
"all property within a class 'must be taxed on a basis of equal-
ity as far as practicable.' "25 As a result, a Wisconsin taxpayer
has successfully argued that his property should be assessed at
a value lower than its recent sale price in view of the assess-
ment of similar properties. 8
In State ex rel. Geipel v. Milwaukee,27 the court was faced
with the question of whether an option price in an option to
purchase agreement could be considered a sale for valuation
purposes. The property involved consisted of two adjacent
tracts of land, one of 20 acres and one of 40 acres. With the
exception of the Geipel's home located on the smaller tract, the
lots were unimproved. The assessment under attack, which
occurred on May 1, 1970, was based only on sales of "compara-
ble" property and resulted in the 1970 assessment being
roughly triple the 1969 assessment. On December 1, 1967, Sky-
line Realty, Inc. had entered into an exclusive option agree-
ment with Geipel to purchase 304 acres of land, which included
this 60 acres, over ten-and-one-half years. The option was set
at $3,305 per acre with adjustments for fluctuations in the Con-
sumer Price Index, and the price on May 1, 1970 was $3,837 per
acre. The assessor had valued the property on that same day
at $6,000 per acre for the 20-acre tract and $7,000 per acre for
the 40-acre tract. It is important to note that the question
involved was not whether the assessment was reasonable, but
rather, whether the assessment was made on a statutory
basis."
The court ruled that "[i]f the agreement was the result of
arm's-length negotiations and is reasonably contemporaneous
with the assessment, the agreed [option] price, like a sale
24. State ex rel. Collins v. Brown, 225 Wis. 593, 275 N.W. 455 (1937).
25. State ex rel. Hensel v. Town of Wilson, 55 Wis. 2d 101, 106, 97 N.W.2d 794,
796 (1972).
26. 55 Wis. 2d 101, 197 N.W.2d 794 (1972).
27. 68 Wis. 2d 726, 229 N.W.2d 585 (1975).
28. When the question involves the reasonableness of the assessment, State ex rel.
Pierce v. Jodon, 182 Wis. 645, 197 N.W. 189 (1924), is the leading case.
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price, is the best indicator of market value." 9 The fact that the
property had been for sale for many years, that this was the
highest offer ever received, and that sales under the option
agreement were consummated before and after the assessment
date, was sufficient, in the absence of contrary evidence, to
establish the arm's-length nature of the transaction.
The court, however, was quick to point out that this does
not mean that an option price will always indicate fair market
value. Where, for example, changing conditions after the op-
tion agreement, result in an uncontemplated increase in mar-
ket value, the option price may be an inappropriate measure
of value. The court also notes that some "unscrupulous individ-
uals" might attempt to establish a lower tax assessment with
a contrived option to purchase agreement. However, the fact
that the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to show an arm's-
length transaction should provide an adequate safeguard."
RANDY S. NELSON
TORTS
I. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: INFORMED CONSENT
The standard of care required of physicians under Wiscon-
sin's informed consent doctrine was modified during this term
of court in Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.I The trial
court upheld a jury verdict that respondent-doctors were negli-
gent in failing to adequately inform the plaintiff-patient of the
risks involved before the performance of a percutaneous fe-
moral aortogram. The jury also held, however, that the doctors'
negligence was not causal of the plaintiff's injuries, and judg-
ment was entered against the plaintiff. As part of the opera-
tion, a dye was injected into the aorta through a catheter in-
serted in the groin so that the arteries leading to the kidneys
could be visualized by X-rays. There was considerable dispute
in the testimony as to what was actually told Scaria with re-
spect to the risks of the procedure. Although Scaria did sign a
29. 68 Wis. 2d at 734, 229 N.W.2d at 589.
30. Id. at 737, 229 N.W.2d at 591.
1. 68 Wis. 2d 1, 227 N.W.2d 647 (1975).
2. Id. at 6, 7, 227 N.W.2d at 650, 651.
